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Protecting Autonomy and Personhood
in Human Subjects Research
Helen Leskovac* and Richard Delgado**
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent commentary has criticized the current Health and Human
Services (HHS) guidelines for inadequately protecting personhood and
autonomy in human subjects research.' Scholars have pointed out that
the guidelines do not require disclosure of all information material to a
subject's decision to participate in a research project,2 place responsibility
to obtain informed consent on the individual who may be least able or
motivated to obtain it (the researcher),3 and provide no effective remedy
for the subject whose right to make an informed choice has been
violated.'
Several suggestions have been offered to increase the protection cur-
rently afforded human subjects in research settings.' This essay examines
three new suggestions: (1) that greater use be made of third parties to
* Instructor, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. J.D., University of California,
Davis, 1984. This article is an expanded version of an address given by Professor Leskovac at South-
ern Illinois University School of Law, November 19, 1986, at the invitation of the Law and Medicine
Society.
** Hopson Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of
Law. J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall), 1974.
1. E.g., Delgado & Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the
Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1987) [hereinafter Bridg-
ing]; Robertson, The Law of Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484 (1979); PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS Appendix E (1981) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]; Subcomm. on Health, Quality of Health Care-Human Experimenta-
tion, Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 974, S. 878, S.J. Res. 71, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) (Parts 1-3).
2. Bridging, supra note 1, at 77-78 n.8; Dresser, Deception Research and the HHS Final Regu-
lations, 3 I.R.B. 3 (Apr. 1981).
3. Bridging, supra note 1, at 76-77; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1985); see Meisel, The "Exceptions"to
the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision-
making, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413, 415-16.
4. Bridging, supra note 1, at 78-86 (and cases cited therein).
5. See supra note 1; Interview with Angela Holder, Professor of Pediatrics, Yale Medical
School, Chief Counsel, Yale-New Haven Hospital (June 15, 1985) (suggesting increased use of "con-
sent monitors"); E. DIENER & R. CRANDALL, ETHICS IN SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 95-
96 (1978) (proposing use of "informed deceit" in deception research); S. BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 194-95 (1978) (same).
1147
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
obtain consent; (2) that human subjects review committees undertake
more searching scrutiny of deception research than the federal guidelines
currently require them to do; and (3) that training in the ethics of re-
search with human subjects be required of all researchers in the social
sciences.
To appreciate the need for reform, it is essential to have a general
understanding of the history and provisions of the federal regulations.
Part I provides this in brief form. Part III shows how the regulations in
a few key respects fail to promote their core purpose-protection of sub-
jects' autonomy in research settings. Part III also suggests new ways the
regulations may achieve heightened protection and illustrates how these
would work in practice. The essay also considers objections that could
be made to the various reforms, together with answers to those
objections.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS
The current federal approach to human subjects research stems
from the 1960s, when revelation of widespread abuses, such as the infa-
mous Tuskegee syphilis study, prompted a call for reform. 6 The Na-
tional Research Act,7 together with detailed guidelines enacted to
implement it,' provides an extensive system of federal oversight.
The regulations require that every institution, including most
United States universities, that receives federal funding for research have
in place one or more Human Subjects Protection Committees (HSPCs),
sometimes called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). IRBs contain lay
and scientific members and must include at least one person not affiliated
with the research institution.9 HSPCs meet regularly and have two prin-
cipal functions: assuring that research proposals have a favorable risk-
benefit ratio and seeing to it that human subjects give informed consent. to
It is with the latter function-protection of informed consent-that this
essay is concerned. Most IRBs seem to regard informed consent, rather
6. Bridging, supra note 1, at 71-72; H. BEECHER, RESEARCH AND THE INDIVIDUAL: HUMAN
STUDIES (1970); H. METSCHERLICH & F. MIELKE, THE DEATH DOCTORS (1962); J. JONES, BAD
BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981) (describing federally funded experiment in
which Black syphilis suffers were left untreated to enable researchers to study natural course of the
disease); Goldby, Experiments in the Willowbrook State School, 1 LANCET 749 (1971) (institutional-
ized retarded children used in experiment to test new vaccine).
7. National Research Service Award Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974) (amending
the Public Health Service Act, as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300t (1976)).
8. The federal guidelines appear in 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-409 (1985). For a review of the his-
tory of Ihe regulations, see Robertson, supra note 1, at 486-89.
9. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d) (1985).
10. Id. §§ 46.111(a), 46.116.
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than risk-benefit ratio, as their prime responsibility."
The federal regulations under which IRBs operate do not define in-
formed consent, but list a number of its components 12 and provide de-
tailed machinery for assuring that subjects understand the risks and
benefits of the research before agreeing to take part.' 3 If the IRB is dis-
satisfied with a proposal's consent provisions, the principal investigator
may be required to revise and improve them before proceeding. 4  In
other settings, informed consent is said to promote a number of values,
including minimizing the risk of harm and establishing cooperation be-
tween physician and patient. 5 The legislative history of the HHS guide-
lines, however, indicates that the principal purpose of the informed
consent provision is protection of human autonomy and
decisionmaking. 6
III. DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH
HUMAN SUBJECTS AND THREE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
In general, IRBs, operating under federal guidelines, do an adequate
job of protecting human subjects' right of self-determination in research
settings. 17 Yet, three areas remain troublesome: biomedical research
that is highly competitive and technical-as is much research in cancer
treatment and recombinant DNA, for example;' research that includes
deception as an essential technique;' 9 and research in the social sci-
ences. 2' This part considers each of these three areas in turn.
11. Interview with David Sears, Chair, UCLA HSPC, Los Angeles, Cal. (Apr. 1982).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (1985) (requiring disclosure of purpose of research; procedures to be
used; risks and discomforts; benefits; alternative treatments; confidentiality; compensation offered;
treatment available if injury results; identity of an individual to contact regarding questions; right to
terminate participation without penalty).
13. Id. § 46.116(b)(1)-(6) (requiring disclosure of any risk to embryo or fetus; circumstances
when investigator may terminate subjects' participation; any costs subject will incur; effect of sub-
ject's withdrawal; information on new findings while research is in progress; number of subjects in
study).
14. Address by Dennis Molfese, Chair, Southern Illinois University HSPC, Carbondale, Ill.
(Nov. 19, 1986) (many research proposals require several revisions before approval); see 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.109(a) (1985) (IRB authorized to require modifications of proposal).
15. E.g., J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT? 85, 90
(1975); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
16. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 - .116 (consent provisions).
17. See Robertson, supra note 1; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note I (incidence of harm
from research low).
18. See infra notes 21-44 and accompanying text (proposing that ineffective disclosure and con-
sent in these settings be controlled by use of third-party intermediaries and consent monitors).
19. See infra notes 45-64 and accompanying text (proposing variations of "informed deceit"
technique for protecting autonomy in deception research). By "deception research" we mean re-
search whose purpose cannot be achieved, at least not so readily, unless the subject is uninformed or
actively misinformed about its nature or purpose.
20. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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A. Pressured Research and Conflict of Interest or Value
In research that is highly competitive and "pressured," reports of
abuses of informed consent and even outright scientific fraud are not un-
common.21 Sociologists of science have written of a culture or atmos-
phere that prizes, above all, success and priority of discovery.22 In such a
setting, researchers may easily overlook or minimize the nuances of, or
even the need for, informed consent.23 In some cases, this tendency is
exacerbated by a mechanistic view of human nature in which persons
behave but do not think, feel, or make choices.
24
In such a climate, the researcher may find it easy to shortcut in-
formed consent and such nonscientific values as autonomy and respect
for personhood. Yet, even when researchers scrupulously desire to pro-
tect these values and follow informed consent rules, their training and
unconscious professional predilection may disable them from doing so.
Informed consent, to be rendered effectively, requires, at a minimum, (a)
good communication skills-that is, the individual obtaining it must be
able to communicate clearly to the human subject; and (b) empathy-the
ability to place oneself in the other's position so as to supply him or her
with the information the other needs, given his or her fears, hopes,
desires, and values.
Barriers to empathy have already been mentioned and will be dis-
cussed further later in this essay. Many researchers also lack the com-
munication skills essential to convey full and accurate information to
their subjects. Few are trained in how to communicate with lay per-
sons;25 moreover, the setting in which consent discussions occur is
21. F.g., W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 66-87 (1982); R. Fox, EXPERI-
MENT PERILOUS (1977); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. 111. 1978), aff'd,
727 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1984) (decision without published opinion); Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Dis-
ease Hosp., 21 A.D.2d 495, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (1964); see Researchers Retract Immune System Data,
S. Illinoisin, Nov. 22, 1986, at 6, col. 1; Misconduct by Scientists Said to be More Common than
Many Believe, Chron. of Higher Educ., May 21, 1986, at 7, col. 1.
22. B. BARBER, J. LALLY, J. MAKARUSHKA, & D. SULLIVAN, RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUB-
JECTS: PIOBLEMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION (1973); W. BROAD & N.
WADE, supra note 21; Merton, Priorities in Scientific Discovery, 22 AM. SoCIOL. REV. 635 (1956); see
B. BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH (1980); E. FREIDSEN,
PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE (1972).
23. 1 .g., McClellan, Informed Consent to Medical Therapy and Experimentation, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 81, 82-83 (1982); Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F.
Supp. 119.6 (D.D.C. 1974).
24. See Shipley, Misinformed Research: An Enigma in Modern Social Science Research, ETH-
ICS IN SCI. & MED. 93 (1977); Sieber, Deception in Social Research I: Kinds of Deception and the
Wrongs They May Involve, 4 I.R.B. 1, 2 (Nov. 1982).
25. J KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); see Boreham & Gibson,
The Informative Process in Medical Consultations.- A Preliminary Investigation, 12 SOC. SCL. & MED.
409 (1978); Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 340, 354-55, 357-58 (1974); Waitzkin & Stoeckle, The Communication of Information about
Human Subjects Research
fraught with hazards. For example, studies of interchanges between per-
sons in roles of dominance and submissiveness indicate that communica-
tion and understanding between the two are often ineffective 2 6-both
parties tend to arrive at inaccurate conclusions about themselves, the
other, and the situation.27 For these reasons, it may be desirable, at least
in some circumstances, to provide for third parties trained in communi-
cation skills to obtain consent.28 Such an arrangement could improve the
accuracy of the information conveyed, as well as reduce the potential for
conflict of interest in the research situation.29
Although a few scholars have recommended their use,3° at present
few researchers use third party intermediaries in the consent process, and
even fewer IRBs require them.31 Some IRBs require "consent
monitors," or provide all potential subjects with the telephone number of
a committee member whom they can contact if they have questions or
complaints.3 2  Certainly these measures are helpful in expanding the
range of resources available to potential subjects who wish information
relevant to their participation in research. Nevertheless, if the autonomy
of the subject33 is considered to be at least as fundamental as his or her
bodily security, then the issue of third party intermediaries is not merely
a question of supplementing the consent process but goes to the heart of
the human values the regulations were intended to further.34
The few institutions that use third parties in obtaining consent seem
to have adopted the practice as much in the interest of economy and
Illness, 8 ADVANCES IN PSYCHOSOM. MED. 180 (1972); Maguire & Rutter, Training Medical Stu-
dents to Communicate, in COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DOCTOR AND PATIENTS 46 (A.E. Bennet
ed. 1976).
26. Cegala, Brunner & Conrad, An Elaboration of the Meaning of Interaction Involvement: To-
ward the Development of a Theoretical Concept, 49 COMMUN. MONO. 229 (1982); Jaspars, King &
Pendleton, The Consultation: A Social Psychological Analysis, in DOCTOR PATIENT COMMUNICA-
TION 139 (D. Pendleton & J. Hasler eds. 1983); Nerem, The Effect of Passive, Uninvolved Interac-
tional Behavior in Dyadic Communication (doctoral dissertation abstract, on file with authors).
27. See supra note 26.
28. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (ways in which third parties can be used).
Third parties could be trained social workers, nurses, or other professionals and paraprofessionals
with good communication skills and a command of basic science.
29. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (federal approach based on this "life plan"
focus; purpose of informed consent is to permit subject to exercise his or her right of choice).
30. See Bridging, supra note 1, at 76 n.39; Robertson, Taking Consent Seriously: IRB Interven-
tion in the Consent Process, 4 I.R.B. I (May 1982).
31. Interview with Angela Holder, supra note 5 (Yale-New Haven Hospital IRB sometimes
appoints third-party "consent monitors" to oversee consent process); see 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(3)
(1985).
32. See Bridging, supra note 1, at 116 & n.217; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116-8 (1985).
33. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; see supra note 16 and accompanying text
(autonomy and self-determination the prime values HHS guidelines seek to protect).
34. This is so because researchers are often inadequately motivated or trained to promote these
values. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
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convenience as of respect for subjects' personhood."' Practically speak-
ing, the use of third party consent obtainers probably is most cost effec-
tive in research projects that include large numbers of subjects or are
time-intensive biomedical projects combining therapeutic treatment with
experimentation.
With respect to research falling in the latter category, most scholars
agree that physician-researchers should be held to the standards outlined
in the 1982 report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 36 In
that Report, the Commission recommended that physicians adopt a view
of patient self-determination in which the patient's values and prefer-
ences are given priority.37 In this "life plan" approach, the physician
must tailor the information given the patient so that it will be relevant to
him or her-an individualized standard of informed consent.38 How-
ever, in light of the many reports emphasizing the disinclination and,
sometimes, inability of physicians or researchers to take such a perspec-
tive,3 9 it may be not only cost effective, but essential, if autonomy is to be
protected, to use third party consent obtainers or intermediaries.
There are a number of ways this might be done; each would need to
be used selectively, depending on the particular characteristics of the re-
search, the subject pool, and the risks of the research. Among the pos-
sibilities are: providing "consent monitors" to observe the principal
investigator and call attention to deficiencies in the consent process; us-
ing paraprofessionals, such as medical social workers or research nurses
with (:ommunications skills or training to obtain consent; using
paraprofessionals in tandem with the principal investigator to improve
the quality of disclosure and consent.
There are a number of possible objections that may be made against
the use of third parties in the consent process. First, with sensitive re-
search there may be an increased risk of breach of confidentiality.'
35. [Interview with Paula Knudson, Staff Assistant, Committee for the Protection of Human
Subjects, University of Texas Health Sciences Center, Houston, Tex. (May 15, 1986).
36. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982); see also
Hollander, Changes in the Concept of Informed Consent in Medical Encounters, 59 J. MED. EDUC.
783 (1984); cf NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDI-
CAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDE-
LINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978) (affirming principle of
respect for persons) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT; adopted as policy by HHS].
37. MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 36, at 21 n.19.
38. Id.
39. 5ee supra note 26; Bridging, supra note 1, at 102-05.
40. The intermediary may carelessly or intentionally disclose personal or medical information
concernirig a patient-subject, or written records prepared by the researcher for the use of the third
party intermediary may come to the attention of outsiders.
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However, this risk may be slight if the third party consent obtainers are
properly trained in the ethics of research and confidentiality of patient-
subject records.4 Such training is currently provided to most medical
professionals and paraprofessionals, for example.42
Second, even if confidentiality is not impaired, interposing a chain of
communication between researcher to subject may increase the risk that
the flow of information to the subject will be impeded or distorted. One
recalls the classic technique used in communications classes to illustrate
the creatiop' of rumors as information is passed from one person to an-
other, or the familiar parlor game illustrating the same principle. Again,
with proper training in communication skills and research methods (such
as is incorporated in the training of medical social workers and research
nurses), the risk of distortion may be controlled.
Finally, it may be argued that third party consent obtainers would
simply add more layers to the bureaucracy that accompanies the research
endeavor, increase the cost of research, and impede the progress of sci-
ence.43 Thus, while the results of the research would not be invalidated,
the approach's cost might endanger the conduct of research at its starting
point. This threat is partially mitigated if, as we believe, the use of third
parties to obtain consent will often save valuable researcher time. Never-
theless, this will not always be the case, and there will be settings in
which the costs of research are increased, and the flow of information to
the subject not greatly improved. In those settings, the rationale for third
parties loses force and IRBs should have discretion whether to use
them.4
B. Research Where No Disclosure is Required: Deception Research
Even more troubling, to the authors' way of thinking, than pres-
sured research where inadequate or halfhearted disclosure is given, is de-
ception research,4" for in this large category of social science research no
41. The Hippocratic Oath exhorts medical professionals to protect patients' privacy; all modem
codes of medical ethics do so as well. W. WADLINGTON, J. WALTZ, & R. DWORKIN, LAW AND
MEDICINE 170-202 (1979).
42. Interview with Theodore R. LeBlang, Professor of Medicine and Chief Legal Counsel,
Southern Illinois University School of Medicine, Carbondale, I11. (July, 1986).
43. Initiation of a research project is already costly and time consuming, often requiring writing
a grant proposal; submitting it to a funding agency; obtaining departmental approval; obtaining
HSPC approval; and arranging for equipment, workers, and subjects.
44. Thus, a proposed guideline might provide: "Third party consent obtainers shall be used
whenever the IRB believes the quality of consent will be significantly improved thereby. Third party
consent obtainers shall not be used where the benefits of their use are likely outweighed by increased
risks to human subjects, or by prohibitive cost."
45. See supra note 19 (defining term).
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informed consent at all need be obtained. 46 The current HHS guidelines
exempit much deception research from review entirely, or empower the
IRB to permit it without compliance with informed consent provisions-
although, as will be discussed, "debriefing" is often required as a type of
substitute." The explicit rationale for this seeming disregard of auton-
omy is as follows: the subject would be susceptible to only minimal risk,
the research may yield valuable knowledge, obtaining informed consent
would invalidate the results of the experiment, thus informed consent
may be disregarded.48
What this chain of reasoning accomplishes is a change of focus from
the essence of research ethics-protection of human autonomy-to the
important, but secondary, consideration of protecting research subjects
from physical or emotional harm.49 The research subject in this scenario
is in a position similar to that of the victim of unconsented-to research
who cannot obtain judicial relief unless he or she can demonstrate a tan-
gible harm, usually a physical consequence of the research.' °
The standard justification-that although the subject's autonomy
may have been diminished or ignored, the minimal risk to the individual
is outweighed by the benefits from the advance in knowledge-is unsatis-
fying. For this justification rests on an implicit and unrecognized shift in
the ethical foundation of research with human subjects. The deontologi-
cal principle5' of respect for persons which the HHS regulations purport
to implement is silently dropped in favor of a utilitarian ethic which aims
to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number.52
46. The justification for nondisclosure is that informing the subject of the purpose or nature of
the study would render the results useless. For examples of deception research see S. MILGRAM,
OBEDIENf-E TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974); Humphreys, Tearoom Trade Im-
personal ,5ex in Public Places, 7 TRANS-ACTION 15 (Jan. 1970).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d)(4) (1985); see generally Dresser, Deception in Social Research III.
The Nature and Limits of Debriefing, 5 I.R.B. 1 (May/June 1983); Deception Research and HHS
Final Regulations, 3 I.R.B. 3 (Apr. 1981).
48. See Dresser, supra note 47 (discussing this rationale).
49. See supra notes 16 & 36-38 and accompanying text (federal guidelines' central goal to pro-
tect autonomy and personhood of subjects). Debriefing cannot promote human autonomy because it
takes place after the fact-ater the decision to experiment with a human subject has been made and
the research completed. If conducted expertly, debriefing may soothe the subjects' indignation and
assure them that their autonomy was forfeited in a good cause. But these considerations do not
restore th lost autonomy or respect for personhood or life plan. Instead, they only reconcile the
subject to the loss.
50. Tort law makes it difficult to recover unless this is shown. See Bridging, supra note 1, at 80-
87 (cases discussed therein).
51. There are two broad types of ethical principles or rules: deontological and teleological (or
utilitarian). Deontological principles assert that certain behaviors-such as keeping promises or
avoiding cruelty-are right in themselves, even though their consequences on particular occasions
may be urfortunate. Utilitarian rules look to the consequences of conduct; they assert that actions
are right or wrong, not by virtue of their nature, but according to whether they produce good results.
52. See supra notes 36-38, 51 and accompanying text (defining "utilitarian ethics"). Deception
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Thus, while the regulations ostensibly seek to protect deontological
values such as personhood, autonomy, and wellbeing, they permit a
switch to utilitarian justifications when informed consent requirements
might invalidate a research design, and count violations of autonomy as a
mere emotional discomfort to be minimized, if possible, by debriefing.53
What is most worrisome about this shift, however, is that the researcher
often makes the decision to short-circuit consent and substitute de-
briefing without oversight of any kind.54 Informal estimates indicate that
as many as 70% of social science research projects using human subjects
may never even be submitted to human subjects committees for review.
55
Deontology aside, the short-term benefits to social scientists from
ready access to deception may be outweighed by the long-term costs.
The conduct of research rests finally on public support and favorable
attitudes toward the research endeavor in general.56 This support may
be eroded if the public comes to believe that in certain areas of research
scholars disregard human subjects as thinking, experiencing individuals
in favor of viewing them as simply a collection of potential behaviors to
be stimulated or elicited externally." If potential human subjects come
to regard researchers as ruthless, self-interested pursuers of their own
gain, cynicism and public opposition may well result.58 The pool of will-
ing research subjects may contract, and research will become more diffi-
cult, not easier, to conduct.
Assuming, however, that deception research does provide us with
valuable knowledge that can be obtained in no other way, we may wish
to consider ethically acceptable means by which it may proceed. This
will necessitate making explicit when and why autonomy is to be
subordinated to scientific utility, and who is to make that trade-off. The
research violates the deontological principle of respect for persons, but purports to find justification
in utility: the research disrespects a few persons but will benefit even more. See M. SHAPIRO & R.
SPECE, BIOETHICS AND LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 72-93 (1981) (explaining ethical
theories and their application to biomedical dilemmas).
53. See Bridging, supra note 1, at 92-97 (performing research on unconsenting subjects deprives
their acts of "moral meaning," a gain many would have valued in their personal risk-benefit calcula-
tion, had they been permitted to make it).
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (little or no IRB oversight).
55. Address by Dennis Molfese, supra note 14 (high percentage of social science researchers do
not submit proposed research for HSPC review, even where HHS regulations and campus rules
require them to do so).
56. A high proportion of research is publicly funded. See Delgado, et al., Can Science be Inop-
portune? Constitutional Validity of Governmental Restrictions on Race-IQ Research, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 128, 175 (1983). The public, if disaffected, may simply withdraw its support. Municipalities
and other government entities may also regulate or forbid research under the police power, if it
believes it to be conducted unethically or in a physically risky manner. Id. at 152-53.
57. See supra note 24 (some researchers hold mechanistic view of human nature).
58. See generally Delgado, et al., supra note 56.
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least troublesome solution would be to secure the prior consent of those
to be deceived.5 9 Autonomy is not abandoned if a person chooses to
waive the right to information when he or she is in agreement with the
purpose of the waiver-because he or she believes it will advance inter-
ests and values he or she embraces and believes in.'
A few writers have sketched variations on this "informed deceit"
approach. Sissela Bok, for example, has proposed that research scientists
engage in dialogue with the public in an effort to win approval of the use
of deception in demonstrably useful research.6 t She argues that if such
matters are thrown open to public discussion, and widespread agreement
follows that the research is so valuable as to outweigh diminishing auton-
omy in certain restricted situations, then the research could be conducted
without weakening public confidence or endangering human
interactions.62
Less global solutions than Dr. Bok's are also possible. For example,
social science researchers may create a "deception pool" by simply ask-
ing subjects, in advance, whether they would agree to be deceived in one
or more future experiments. Alternatively, "proxy consent" could be re-
quired: IRBs could insist that deception researchers identify a group of
subjecits as similar as possible to the group to be deceived, and ask the
former group how they would feel about participating in a research study
in which the nature or purpose of the study was unknown to them. Fi-
nally, "representative consent" might be insisted on. In deception re-
search involving lawyers, for example, the researchers might fully
disclose the research to Bar Association leaders and obtain their support
before conducting the research with lawyers.
Necessarily, all approaches imply that deception techniques must be
used sparingly and only in compliance with explicit restrictions and con-
ditions. Further, if deception research is to be based on utilitarian princi-
ples, then the regulations should reflect this shift and reconcile it with the
deontological approach adopted by HHS.63
59. The consent obtained would be consent to be deceived, not consent to take part in a particu-
lar research project. The latter would entail fully informing the subject about the project, which
would, with deception research, render the project useless.
60. The subject thus in effect says: "I agree to be deceived and forfeit my right of self-determi-
nation. do so autonomously and for reasons of my own, including my desire to help these investi-
gators advance human knowledge-even though I do not know what sort of knowledge it is they
seek to generate."
61. S. BOK, supra note 5, at 194-95.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 36, 44 (proposed new guidelines for third-party consent obtainers). A new
approach to deception research should require, at a minimum, that the regulations: (1) require that
nondeceptive alternatives to generating the knowlege sought be exhausted first or be shown impracti-
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C. Habituating Researchers to Respect Informed Consent: Improving
the Training and Education of Social Science Researchers
Modification of the HHS guidelines to provide for third-party in-
termediaries and abolition of the current regulatory void for deception
research will do much to ameliorate the worst abuses. Yet, in the long
term, regulation will not be fully effective until researchers internalize the
values of respect for persons and autonomy that underlie the regula-
tions.64 Researchers in many fields receive little formal training in the
ethics of research. Additionally, most subjects have little or no informa-
tion or awareness of their rights when confronted with demands from
professionals who occupy positions of status and prestige higher than
their own. Many studies indicate that laypersons in general are condi-
tioned to accede to the wishes of such persons.65 Training could sensitize
social science researchers to the obligations of research ethics and inform
potential human subjects of their rights in the research situation.
Unfortunately, many graduate social science departments do not re-
quire ethical training as part of their degree programs, much less as a
prequisite for appointment of research faculty.66 Traditionally, universi-
ties and professional groups are left free to regulate their internal affairs
and the conduct of their members. If such groups are slow to monitor
themselves, however, standards of conduct may be imposed externally.
This may be necessary with regard to social science research that is spon-
sored by the federal government.67
One manner in which this might be done is to amend the federal
guidelines to include a requirement of training in the ethics of human
subjects research. Universities and other research facilities might be
given a number of options in complying with this requirement. The IRB
or campus research director might conduct seminars or periodic lectures.
Graduate courses might be required as a degree requirement in all fields
where research with human subjects is common. Such measures may not
still the actions of the few willful and opportunistic researchers deter-
mined to conduct research at any cost, but they would sensitize all re-
cable; (2) demand that the least deceptive alternative be selected; (3) insist on some form of prior
informed deceit or proxy consent.
64. Many researchers currently do not. See supra notes 21-24 & 39 (many researchers work in
a climate that values priority of discovery over deontological values of respect for personhood and
"life plan").
65. See generally supra note 26.
66. A recent study showed only 10 graduate social science courses devoted to research ethics.
ETHIcs TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 166-67 (D. Callahan & S. Bok, eds. 1980).
67. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (impetus for enactment of HHS Guidelines
came from reports of human-subject abuses and uncaring behavior by researchers in the 1960s and
early 1970s).
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searchers to the ethical problems inherent in any research project that
includes human subjects. Further, they would provide training in how to
analyze and solve ethical dilemmas researchers will encounter in their
professional work. Such requirements are commonplace in many profes-
sional fields, including law and medicine.68 There is certainly as good, if
not better, reason to institute such requirements in the training of social
science professionals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal guidelines for human-subjects research, and the IRBs
charged with effectuating them, provide a comprehensive approach to
protec;ting autonomy and respect for persons in federally funded re-
search. Yet, a number of areas remain troublesome. We have argued
that greater attention than that currently afforded must be given to three
problems-that of halfhearted or pressured disclosure, that of deception
research, and that of the social science researcher who lacks training in
research ethics. To avoid erosion of the ethical foundations of federal
oversight, as well as to protect human autonomy and respect for science
on the part of the public, reforms are needed. Provision should be made
for third-party consent intermediaries in many settings. Deception re-
search must be more closely monitored than it currently is, and provision
for proxy consent or "informed deceit" must be made. Finally, as a sup-
plement to heightened regulatory efforts and amendment of the regula-
tions, graduate and research programs, especially in the social sciences,
must offer training and education in the ethics of human research.
68. The ABA requires as a condition of accreditation that all law schools teach professional
responsibility and ethics. See supra notes 41-42 (similar teaching in medical schools).
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